| [ history ] in KIDS 글 쓴 이(By): 구르미 (구르미) 날 짜 (Date): 2006년 8월 4일 금요일 오전 10시 47분 43초 제 목(Title): 레바논-이스라엘 분쟁관련 기고문들 요즘 레바논-이스라엘, 팔레스타인-이스라엘 분쟁(?), 보다 정확히는 이스라엘의 레바논,팔레스타인 침공 사태를 미국의 언론에서 다루는 것을 보고 개탄하고 있는 중이었습니다. 뉴욕타임즈의 헤드라인만 봐도 왜 이리 편파적인지 논조는 폭스 케이블 뉴스 채널을 방불케 하는지... 뭐 이런 생각이 들었는데 하루는 폭스뉴스를 보고 있는데 뉴스진행자와 장군출신군사평론가의 대화내용을 듣고 황당해 한 적이 있습니다. "레바논에 있다가 사이프러스로 피난한 미국 시민권자들중에 테러리스트로 의심되는 사람들이 있을 가능성이 적지 않으므로 주의해야 한다" 미국 주류 언론의 정도(폭스뉴스는 제외하고)를 ㄼ게 요약하자면 아무래도 사실의 70%만 이야기하기(또는 진실감추기) 정도가 되지 않을까 싶습니다. 뉴스기사들과는 달리 사건에 직간접적으로 관련이 있거나 있었던 사람들이 기고한 글들(Op-ed contributer's columns)은 그럭저럭 읽어줄만 합니다. 두개의 기고문을 퍼왔습니다. 하나는 이스라엘의 레바논 점령시절 레바논의 자살테러를 연구한 시카고 대학의 교수가 쓴 글이고, 또 하나는 레바논 점령군으로 복무한 적이 있는 이스라엘 변호사의 글입니다. 첫번째글에서는 자살테러에 참여했던 이들의 인적구성에 대한 분석이 흥미롭고 말미에 중국이 언급되는 것도 주목해둘만 하다고 봅니다. 두번째글에서는 레바논-이스라엘 모니터링 그룹의 활동에 대한 Anecdotal episode가 매우 감명깊었습니다. ------ Op-Ed Contributor Ground to a Halt By ROBERT PAPE Published: August 3, 2006 Chicago ISRAEL has finally conceded that air power alone will not defeat Hezbollah. Over the coming weeks, it will learn that ground power won work either. The problem is not that the Israelis have insufficient military might, but that they misunderstand the nature of the enemy. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, Hezbollah is principally neither a political party nor an Islamist militia. It is a broad movement that evolved in reaction to Israel invasion of Lebanon in June 1982. At first it consisted of a small number of Shiites supported by Iran. But as more and more Lebanese came to resent Israel occupation, Hezbollah � never tight-knit � expanded into an umbrella organization that tacitly coordinated the resistance operations of a loose collection of groups with a variety of religious and secular aims. In terms of structure and hierarchy, it is less comparable to, say, a religious cult like the Taliban than to the multidimensional American civil-rights movement of the 1960's. What made its rise so rapid, and will make it impossible to defeat militarily, was not its international support but the fact that it evolved from a reorientation of pre-existing Lebanese social groups. Evidence of the broad nature of Hezbollah's resistance to Israeli occupation can be seen in the identity of its suicide attackers. Hezbollah conducted a broad campaign of suicide bombings against American, French and Israeli targets from 1982 to 1986. Altogether, these attacks � which included the infamous bombing of the Marine barracks in 1983 � involved 41 suicide terrorists. In writing my book on suicide attackers, I had researchers scour Lebanese sources to collect martyr videos, pictures and testimonials and the biographies of the Hezbollah bombers. Of the 41, we identified the names, birth places and other personal data for 38. Shockingly, only eight were Islamic fundamentalists. Twenty-seven were from leftist political groups like the Lebanese Communist Party and the Arab Socialist Union. Three were Christians, including a female high-school teacher with a college degree. All were born in Lebanon. What these suicide attackers - and their heirs today -� shared wasnot a religious or political ideology but simply a commitment to resisting a foreign occupation. Nearly two decades of Israeli military presence did not root out Hezbollah. The only thing that has proven to end suicide attacks, in Lebanon and elsewhere, is withdrawal by the occupying force. Thus the new Israeli land offensive may take ground and destroy weapons, but it has little chance of destroying the Hezbollah movement. In fact, in the wake of the bombings of civilians, the incursion will probably aid Hezbollah's recruiting. Equally important, Israel's incursion is also squandering the good will it had initially earned from so-called moderate Arab states like Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The countries are the court of opinion that matters because, while Israel cannot crush Hezbollah, it could achieve a more limited goal: ending Hezbollah acquisition of more missiles through Syria. Given Syria's total control of its border with Lebanon, stemming the flow of weapons is a job for diplomacy, not force. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, Sunni-led nations that want stability in the region, are motivated to stop the rise of Hezbollah. Under the right conditions, the United States might be able to help assemble an ad hoc coalition of Syria neighbors to entice and bully it to prevent Iranian, Chinese or other foreign missiles from entering Lebanon. It could also offer to begin talks over the future of the Golan Heights. But Israel must take the initiative. Unless it calls off the offensive and accepts a genuine cease-fire, there are likely to be many, many dead Israelis in the coming weeks � and a much stronger Hezbollah. Robert A. Pape, a professor of political science at the University of Chicago, is the author of "Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism." ------------ Op-Ed Contributor Lebanon's Force for Good By ADIR GURION WALDMAN Published: August 2, 2006 IN the summer of 1998, I was an infantry soldier in the Israel Defense Forces. Preparing for an operation in southern Lebanon, my platoon received some unusual orders: no one, under any circumstance, was to open fire. This was a significant departure from our standard rules of engagement, which permitted firing upon sight at Hezbollah forces. The apparent reason was that representatives of the United States, France, Israel, Lebanon and Syria were in the area that day for a meeting of the Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group. Today, Israeli soldiers are again in southern Lebanon. As pundits propose various diplomatic solutions to the crisis embroiling the region, lost in all of these suggestions is the Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group, the one institution that in the past was able to prevent war in the Middle East. The Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group was born a decade ago when, as today, Israel sought to root out Hezbollah from southern Lebanon. In late April 1996, after two months of intense warfare, Secretary of State Warren Christopher set out for a weeklong session of shuttle diplomacy that culminated in an agreement calling for Israel and Hezbollah to shield civilians from violence. The Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group would oversee compliance with this pledge. Over the next four years, until Israel withdrawal from Lebanon, violence did not cease, but the parties were able to keep it from spiraling out of control. Through regular meetings of high-level military and diplomatic officials, the monitoring group resolved disputes, arranged temporary cease-fires and reined in spurts of violence. In December 1999, for example, when Israeli shells mistakenly hit a Lebanese school, a series of phone calls through the monitoring group prevented Hezbollah from retaliating against Israeli civilians. In another instance, the group facilitated an exchange of prisoners between Israel and Hezbollah. A long-term diplomatic solution to the current crisis should include the resurrection of the monitoring group and the establishment of a parallel Israeli-Palestinian body. These groups would be modeled on the old monitoring group, but with a new mandate: to oversee the full disarmament of Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations. If Western troops won take on that mission, the Israeli-Lebanese group could monitor the Lebanese Army accomplishment of the task. Routine meetings of both groups would help ensure enduring cease-fires on all fronts. Most important, the monitoring groups would create a constructive new channel of communication among Israel, Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinian Authority. Away from the spotlight that has doomed past diplomatic efforts, these parties could freely negotiate over outstanding differences, and through those meetings, rising military and diplomatic leaders could build key personal relationships. The monitoring groups would also provide a confidential forum where the parties could work to restrain violent flare-ups, rather than engaging in escalating tit-for-tat attacks. Thus, for example, an Israeli-Palestinian monitoring group, which might also include Egypt and Jordan, could immediately convene in the event of any spike in Israeli-Palestinian violence. In 2000, I interviewed Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group delegates, who spoke about their work with enthusiasm. They told me of times when, after particularly egregious episodes of violence, the group was able to initiate immediate back-channel contacts that staved off reprisals, and they recalled how Israeli, Lebanese and Syrian military officers formed personal bonds of trust. When an Israeli general's term on the monitoring group ended, he told me, his counterparts gave their final farewells with tears in their eyes. Today, diplomatic leaders must not overlook this extraordinary precedent for calming tensions in the Levant. Adir Gurion Waldman, a lawyer, is the author of "Arbitrating Armed Conflict: Decisions of the Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group." |