| [ history ] in KIDS 글 쓴 이(By): yjkwon (Kwon, Y.J.) 날 짜 (Date): 1996년03월12일(화) 15시32분30초 KST 제 목(Title): 유고의 역사(분쟁의 원인) 다음 글은 미국에 있는 어느 한 대학에 들어가서 퍼온 글임. 다소 길므로 퍼다가 읽어보는 것이 좋을 듯함. Copywrite (C) by Richard Bondi, rsb5c@Virginia.edu WHAT IS GOING ON IN (EX-) YUGOSLAVIA, ANYWAY?! For the past year, every front page has run daily stories about Yugoslavs with unpronounceable names fighting and killing each other. If you're like most people, you've found it impossible to make sense of these reports unless you started following the story back in, say, 1989. And so you've given up, and written the whole issue off as one more incomprehensible miasma of hatreds, rather like Lebanon. No Balkan news story seems different from any other; everyone is throwing everything they've got at everyone else. To make matters worse, newspaper articles are usually just updates without an overview. If you aren't a Balkan scholar but want to know why people in old Yugoslavia are killing each other, read on. Geography and Early History to 1914 Yugoslavia is not a distant country. From the great French port of Bordeaux, fly due east over Italy, passing over a sliver of ocean call the Adriatic, and before its fine beaches have disappeared from view, the anti-aircraft fire will tell you that you are over what used to be Yugoslavia. Welcome to the Balkans, a huge triangle pointing into the Mediterranean that includes parts of Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, all of what used to be Yugoslavia, Albania, and finally Greece. To the east is the vast expanse of Turkey shielding the Middle East; to the northeast, the former Soviet Union dwarfs all these lands. The Balkans, then, are a natural bridge between East and West, and, until this century, they were an emphatically disunited melange of tiny Slavic kingdoms and fiefdoms. Invading powers have been quick to recognize the area's strategic value; the Ottoman Turks stormed up the Balkans in the Middle Ages, famously defeating the Serbian Kingdom in 1389 and eventually reaching the gates of Vienna in 1683. As the Turks power declined, Austria and Hungary crept in, transforming the Balkans into Austro-Hungarian colonies. The Slovenes, Croats, Montenegrins and Serbs eventually realized that whatever their differences, uniting as one country would give them a solid bulwark against further rude trespassing. Throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, the Austro-Hungarian empire fought the new nationalism that threatened to tear away their Balkan colonies. To emphasize Balkan determination to throw the Austrians out, nationalist Gavrilo Princip stepped up to the Austrian crown prince's carriage in Sarajevo in 1914 and put a bullet into him, thereby starting World War I. Four years later, the Allies rewarded the Slavs' wartime service with independence. On the 1st of December, 1918, Prince-Regent Alexander of Serbia joyfully proclaimed the united Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Yugoslavia began, as it ended 72 years later, with ethnic violence: within hours of Alexander's announcement, bloody rioting broke out in Croatia. It is impossible to understand why without knowing the old Yugoslav map. In the north is Slovenia, which shares borders with Italy, Austria, and Hungary. Beneath it is Croatia (capital Zagreb), shaped like an upside down U embracing the area of Bosnia-Herzegovina (capital Sarajevo). Underneath them are tiny Montenegro on the Adriatic coast, and Serbia (capital Belgrade) with its provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo. Last and southernmost is Macedonia. In 1914, Austria still held sway over Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia in the north. Sovereign Serbia dominated Montenegro; further southeast were the complicated political borders of the crumbling Ottoman empire. During the 19th century, Serbia had been independent, acquiring small pieces of the Balkans, seeing itself as liberating them from foreign rule and pulling them within a common Slav orbit. To Croatians, however, who spent centuries preserving their identity despite hostile occupation, the Serbian call in 1918 for a south Slav (Yugoslav) union looked suspiciously like an invitation to exchange Austrian for Serbian domination. The Croats wanted a federation with extensive local government; but, due to circumstances and bad luck, they got a Serbian prince's centralized government in Belgrade, engendering the bloody rioting of 1918 and decades of political jostling between federalists and centralists. The new kingdom's first decade was an experiment in parliamentary monarchy that ended with representatives brawling and shooting each other in Parliament; the king suspended Parliament and ruled alone for another ten years. This made the Croats about as happy as they had been back in 1918, so the monarchical experiment was not going terribly well when Nazi tanks and bombers plowed into the country in 1941. With the Germans were 300 proteges, terrorists of the Croatian nationalist Ustasha movement who were quickly set up as a Nazi puppet regime. The Ustasha were extremists who favored an independent Croatian state, but they had little Croatian support and, outlawed in Yugoslavia, had trained over the years in Italian and Hungarian terrorist camps. They had become adept throughout the 1930's at bombings and assassinations. Unfortunately for Yugoslavia, they were also completely mad. Their leader Ante Pavelic hated Serbs as much as the Nazis hated Jews, and once showed off a basket of human eyes gouged from Serbs "given to me as a present by my dear Ustashas." [1] By the end of the war, they had murdered hundreds of thousands of Serbs in concentration camps, razing villages, setting fire to Serbian churches with all the villagers locked inside, and committing other acts of terror that the Croatians tried to forget and the Serbs did not. Meanwhile, Yugoslavia won a reputation with the Allies as the home of the toughest, most indomitable resistance fighters in Europe. But instead of fighting Germans, the Yugoslavs spent most of their time fighting and massacring each other. They were divided into two groups: the communist Partisans, led by the inspiring marshall Tito, and the royalist Chetniks. Since the communists believed they were fighting a revolutionary war, they devoted themselves to killing Chetniks and any other political opponents they might have on the "inevitable" day of the Allies' and the workers' Soviet Union's victory [2]. In the end, the Partisans proved themselves far better organized than the Chetniks and received Allied military support. Tito's Yugoslavia Having thoroughly smashed possible opponents, Tito emerged after World War II as the clear leader of Yugoslavia and spent the first postwar years removing anyone who could pose a challenge to his communist government. Tito's secret police, the O.Z.N., became one of the most effective in Eastern Europe. (The classic film "Father is Away on a Business Trip" is about these years.) As a Communist agitator who had spent years trying to undermine the previous Yugoslav government, Tito was keenly aware of its central weakness: the centralism-federalism split along Serbo-Croat lines. He set about checking it in a number of ways. First Tito had to counteract the usual Croatian fears of centralism. This he did by breaking off parts of Serbia into provinces and republics, so that the Serbian republic ended up being no larger than Croatia and no longer dominated it. Ethnic discord was essentially outlawed. Second, he brilliantly established a number of Yugoslav myths that endeared the country to the West and to Yugoslavs themselves. For the first time, Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, and the other numerous Balkan nationalities felt a patriotism directed not towards their own small enclaves but toward Yugoslavia, a contrived country. Among these myths: that the Partisans had single-handedly beaten the Germans; that Tito had told Stalin in 1948 to get out and stay out of Yugoslavia, thus making his the only country ever to escape the Iron Curtain; and that Yugoslavia had discovered a marvelous "third way" between communism and capitalism. In truth, the Partisans had spent most of the war killing Chetniks; the Soviet army - not the Partisans - actually expelled the Germans. And it was Stalin who expelled Yugoslavia from the Communist block, not vice versa. But the West was overjoyed and lavished aid and prestige on "brave Yugoslavia." Within a year, the Soviets found they could not, as in Hungary, retake Yugoslavia with tanks without risking a world war. Tito's "third way" economic system emerged from the observation that communist command economies were bureaucratic and inefficient, and that while capitalist economies were efficient, they exploited workers in order to make a profit. So Tito introduced the idea of "self-management," in which neither the state nor a private owner managed the company; the workers themselves did. It brought admiration from East and West, flocks of eager Western sociologists, and finally, in the 1980s, economic ruin. Having welded his country together by the 1950s, Tito was forced to play a dangerous game. Other Eastern block countries used the secret police to deal with ethnic rivalries, but they had at most two or three different ethnic groups to worry about. Yugoslavia had six or more. Try as it might to be a single nation state, it remained a state of nationalities. Tito eventually found that in order to avoid violating his central premise of not allowing any national group to dominate others, he and the Party could not exercise absolute Stalinist rule from Belgrade. Beginning in the '60s, more and more economic power was ceded to the republics, while the country's ideology remained firmly Communist-controlled. This was a dangerous balancing act. If Tito gave too much power to each nationality, Yugoslavia might break up into separate countries. But if he suppressed nationalism too harshly, the Croats, Slovenes, Serbs, and others might stop carping at each other and wake up to the fact that they had a common oppressor - the Yugoslav Communist Party led by Tito. The Croats have always been closest to insurrection, and in 1971 a series of student demonstrations - the Maspok movement - culminated in demands for the right to secede. The demonstrations were put down with mass arrests and imprisonments. It became a crime in Croatia to display the Croatian flag. I spoke with one Croatian couple now living in Charlottesville who tensely recalled how the husband was detained by the police after they discovered a legally purchased tape of nationalistic songs in his boom box. His uncle was not so lucky: he went to jail for singing such songs. Serbs came to dominate the government and local police in Croatia, as a further check to Croatian nationalism. Whether these were Titoist or ethnic policies is unclear, but the Croatians remained convinced that it was Serbian chauvinism. Twenty years later, the anger and hostility bred of these times would enable a newly elected Croatian nationalist party to usher the republic all the more easily into war. Until around 1980 the Yugoslavians were relatively well off. In part they had been saved from the unsuccessful experiment of self-management by Western loans, which began to come due in the early '80s. But Yugoslavia suffered most from the fact that Tito's decentralization had given it not one national economy but eight. None of the republics traded with each other. There was no central control of distribution, of prices or wages. There were eight different railways, power companies, postal services, and so on. Western businessmen would come back from Yugoslavia shaking their heads saying, "Is Yugoslavia really a country?" Slovenia and Croatia prospered, but were not happy about supporting the much poorer republics through federal taxes. When economic depression struck in 1980, the same year that Tito died, all the republics agreed that only centrally coordinated reforms could save the economy. But none could agree on what central measures to adopt, and because of Tito's earlier decentralization, it was now impossible to force all the republics to cooperate. The Croats and Slovenes wanted to privatize, but the Serbs knew this would lead to massive Serb unemployment as their inefficient factories closed down. By mid 1985 the Party had openly split over how to deal with the crisis. With inflation at 100%, unemployment at 15%, growth down to 1% and strikes breaking out everywhere, the Prime Minister described the situation as "explosive." [3] Different Party factions with different solutions pushed and shoved, each trying to overcome the others and drag the government into motion again. As a Belgrade waiter put it, "To decide the price of this little glass of apricot juice, delegations from eight separate republics have to agree." [4] Yugoslavs watched helplessly as the plunging economy only bred greater political paralysis. The center was about to give. The Rise of Milosevic and the Breakup The Serbian province of Kosovo has a special place in Serbian hearts. It is the cradle of an ancient medieval Serbian kingdom, dotted with beautiful architectural treasures. Unfortunately it is also now home to a population that is 90% poor ethnic Albanians, who have made the province Serbia's Northern Ireland and an unpleasant place for the remaining Serbs. For years the Serbs had sadly accepted the fact that one day they would lose Kosovo, either by its becoming a separate republic or even merging with Albania. Or so it seemed. One April evening in 1987, the president of the Serb Communist Party angrily jumped up from the meeting on Serb rights he was attending in Kosovo with Communist Party officials. He strode out onto the building steps in front of which ethnic Albanian policemen of the Kosovo police were clubbing Serb demonstrators, and announced that he would not sit inside while Serbs were being beaten. There was an unexpected, delirious roar of approval from the public back in Serbia, and Slobodan Milosovic realized he had stumbled onto a passionate issue that could propel the paralyzed party forward again. With Kosovo the sole plank in his platform, he rallied support and by the end of the year had ousted the other factions of the Party [5]. The Serb Communist Party was on the move again. Deflecting the Serbian public's attention away from economic problems, Milosevic cracked down on all opposition groups and newspapers in Serbia, fomented insurrections and installed pro-Serb governments in the two provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, and brutally put down massive riots in Kosovo. At the same time he called for greater centralization of the Yugoslav state, playing to Serbian resentment of Croatia's and Slovenia's economic success by accusing them of anti-Serb activity. How much of this he believed himself and how much was mere demagoguery is difficult to say, but the Serbs rallied behind him in his quest to dominate Yugoslavia or at least win back the greater Serbia that Tito had trimmed. The Serbs saw the solution to their economic woes not in harsh economic changes, but in reconstituting a greater, larger Serbia. If Milosevic had set out to reawaken the fears that had undone prewar Yugoslavia and that Tito had carefully tried to still, he could not have done it better. He called for greater Serb control over the other republics, and demonstrated just how serious he was by heavy-handedly and blatantly doing everything short of annexing Vojvodina and Kosovo. The greatest tragedy and the chief cause of Yugoslavia's subsequent breakup being so bloody, was the untempered rise to power of nationalists like Milosevic. Serbian nationalism inspired fear and aggressive Croatian and Slovenian counter-nationalism, ensuring that such passionate enemies would eventually go war with each other. In 1989-90 the Iron Curtain fell. Communist governments all over Eastern Europe were toppled in popular revolutions, and the republics of Yugoslavia realized that if they did not immediately allow free elections, revolution would spill into Yugoslavia as well. In Croatia and Slovenia, the Nationalists won overwhelmingly, setting the stage for secession. The moderate social democrats, led by the heroes of the non-violent Maspok movement of 20 years before, were annihilated at the Croatian polls, as were the Communists. It was May 1990. In just over a year the country would be at war. The Croatian Democratic Party (the HDZ) under General Franjo Tudjman quickly and insensitively set about righting the wrongs of the past twenty years. The number of Serbs in the government had for decades been out of all proportion to the percentage of Serbs living in Croatia, and they were now largely replaced by Croats. Although Serbs and Croats speak virtually the same language, Serbs use the Cyrillic alphabet, Croats the Roman. Tudjman announced work on a new Croatian constitution in which only the Roman script would be official, so that Cyrillic could not be used in legal documents or taught in schools, even in areas of Croatia where Serbs had lived for generations. All over Croatia, the Yugoslav flag was replaced by the ancient Croatian national flag. Unfortunately, it resembled the flag used by the Ustasha, the violent Croatian extremists, and Croatian Serbs began to feel Like Jews surrounded by swastikas, like foreigners in their own country. When they tried to organize a referendum against the new constitution, Tudjman declared the move illegal. In the Krajina, a region along most of the left leg of Croatia's U, roads and rail-way tracks were blocked in rioting that was tensely defused [6] . The HDZ wasted little time consolidating its new power. Many of its leaders were ex-Communists, who had mastered the art of eliminating political opposition. Newspapers that did not adopt the new party Line found themselves bereft of government funds. Opposition parties still have virtually no access to state-run television, let alone the newly pro-government press, and no funds to counter the lavish public funding for the incumbent HDZ's propaganda [7]. Revealingly, the government blasted the venerable and recently deceased political magazine Danas not just as "pro-Serb," "a nest of Chetnicks," and "Communist," but also the "mouthpiece of the opposition," as if one could not oppose the HDZ without also being every conceivable kind of enemy [8]. All this has produced an atmosphere in which criticism of the regime provokes ridicule and even repression, especially since the country is at war. Recently four journalists were charged, although not imprisoned, for critical pieces they had written about the government [9]. Despite these repressions, however, Croatia has not been the fascist state Serbia accused it of becoming after the HDZ came into power. Across the republican (but not yet national) border in Serbia, Milosevic and the press he controlled exploded with shrill warnings that an Ustasha state was rising again, backed by the Western Catholic church against the Serb Roman Orthodoxy; that the Croatians would slaughter their Serb minority; and that Germany was trying to expand all the way to the Baltic and had to be resisted by Serbia holding on to Croatia. Years of propaganda first under Tito and then under Milosevic made fertile ground for these wild theories. Milosevic's great rallying cry was that Serbs everywhere had an inalienable right to live in a single state. Meanwhile Serb guerrilla groups sprang up inside Croatia, supported by Milosevic. At last, on a very hot day in July of 1991, shortly after Croatia had formally declared itself independent of Yugoslavia, the seething, sputtering cauldron of national hatreds exploded. War Against Civilians The gunmen came from out of the surrounding forests. They attacked the Croatian village of Glina, and within hours had sealed it off from dozens of Croat militia sent in to reinforce it. Later in the day tanks from the Federal Yugoslav Army (JNA) rolled in to separate the battling sides and "stop the bloodshed," but in fact allowed the Serb guerrillas to keep their new territory. More villages, often inhabited mostly by Croatian Serbs, were taken this way for two more months, and then the JNA and the Serb irregulars began a terrible of offensive that was to set the pattern for the rest of the war. First the JNA would soften up a village with minutes or hours of bombardment, then let in the Serb irregulars who would round up all Croatian villagers, often the irregulars' own neighbors with whom they had lived amiably for years, and either massacre or drive them off, loot their houses, and then bombard the houses and Catholic churches into rubble, or bus in Serbian Serbs to move into them. During the Serb offensives, hundreds of fleeing villagers trying desperately to paddle across the river Kupa to safety were mortared and shelled by tanks, friends and neighbors blown apart and drowned before each others' eyes. In the next few months the city of Vukovar, with over 40,000 inhabitants, was systematically destroyed, house by house, and other cities were severely damaged. Whatever else this was supposed to achieve, it ensured that the Croatians would not be able to ever return. The most important thing to understand about the present Yugoslav conflict is that it is not a war; it is called a war because no word has yet been invented to describe it. In war, two or more armed sides fight each other. In the course of war, atrocities include attacks against defenseless civilians. But in the new Yugoslav conflict, virtually all attacks are against civilians, and only very occasionally is an armed foe engaged in battle. As one Bosnian in Charlottesville put it, it is a war against houses, against churches, and against people, not against another army [10]. Understandably, Croatian reprisals began at once, although on nowhere near the scale of the Serbian offensives. Prominent Serbs started disappearing throughout Croatia; some were found murdered. Serb shops and kiosks were bombed. During a lull in the horrific Serbian bombardment of the small town of Cospic, about a hundred resident Serbs were led away by Croats and murdered. But the Croatian atrocities were reactive and far fewer in number than the Serbs'. What was less understandable was the HDZ's refusal to speak out against the terror against Serbs or to prosecute, which of course only encouraged more reprisals [11]. By the time Cyrus Vance organized a cease-fire in January 1992 between the hastily assembled Croatian army and the JNA, the Serbs had occupied about 1/3 of what used to be the Croatian republic. By then Croatia was officially a state, recognized by the European Community and the United States. Separated by UN troops, the armies faced each other tensely (and still do). Over half a million Croats had become refugees in their own country, and at least 10,000 Serbs and Croats had died in less than 6 months [12]. But the conflict had not ended. It had only just begun. Recall that Croatia is shaped like an upside down U, its only borders with Serbia traditionally being the small lower ends of the U. Straddled inside its arms is the small state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, with a much larger border with Serbia (and small Montenegro), stretching from end to end of the U. Bosnia- Herzegovina has, or until a few months ago had, a population of 4.2 million, consisting of Muslims, Serbs, and Croatians in a ratio of roughly 4:3:2 [13]. With Croatia and Slovenia independent states, this republic of many Muslims and Croatians suddenly saw itself vastly outnumbered by Serbs in what was left of Yugoslavia, and with ample evidence of how Milosevic treated ethnic minorities. Even as Vance's uneasy cease-fire was silencing the guns, Bosnia- Herzegovina was trying to secede. But when Milosevic and the JNA gazed over the border into this tiny republic, they saw not just more armed bands of Bosnian and Herzegovinan Serbs trying to break off a part of the republic for Serbia. They also saw the old Yugoslavia's arsenal, the site of virtually all its arms factories and munitions dumps, which Tito had placed there in the heartland to thwart a possible Soviet invasion. In March 1992 the JNA marched into Bosnia-Herzegovina [14]. The anti-civilian war in Bosnia-Herzegovina is if anything more terrible than it was in Croatia. If your aim was to remove all Muslims and Croats from areas that you wanted to repopulate with Serbs, and you had only a few Serbian fighters, what would you do? Would you storm each city, fight to capture it house by house, to round up the citizens, losing many of your fighters? Of course not. You would lay siege to cities, sit back at a safe distance and shell them continuously, cut off all water and food, not allow anyone to be escorted out, and generally do everything in your power to so terrify and demoralize the inhabitants that they would finally flee of their own free will rather than defend their city. That is why the Serbs try to stop relief flights into Sarajevo and do not allow even women and children out [15].[@@@]Theirs is a policy of city torture, designed to empty cities with a minimum of losses to their own side. A similarly dreadful method is employed in smaller villages and towns. Those taken by force suffer massacres, torture, internment in concentration camps with virtually no food or water, and deportation in cattle cars, so that the inhabitants of towns that have not yet been reached flee in terror, and their empty homes are taken without firing a shot. This is the so-called ethnic cleansing. What makes the tragedy even worse is that whereas Croats have Croatia and the Serbs Serbia to turn to, the Bosnian and Herzegovian Muslims have - no-one. With nowhere to go, Muslim civilians have flooded into Europe and rapidly filled Serbian concentration camps. To add to the mayhem, a real war has broken out in Bosnia-Herzegovina between Croat and Serb irregulars as they battle to divide up the doomed republic between them. If Tito were alive today, and if he were in the habit of giving State of the Disunion addresses, he might have the following to report on August 1st, 1992. "Comrades! In Croatia, Serb and Croat armed forces remain separated by UN Protection Forces. There is no possibility of returning to prewar borders, because even if the Croats could return to their homes, they would refuse to live with their former Serb neighbors, who also refuse to leave. The Bosnian Serbs, along with Serb irregulars from Serbia and the JNA, control and are busy "ethnically cleansing" a wide strip around the top of the Croatian U, down the right leg, and along the bottom border of Bosnia-Herzegovina with Serbia. They also control a land corridor linking them with the Krajina, now captured from Croatia. After the invasion in March, the UN slapped sanctions on what remains of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and the resulting disenchantment with Milosevic has resulted in demonstrations in Belgrade that he is attempting to suppress. A power struggle between two Serb parties trying to replace him has the JNA and the irregulars split and shooting at each other in the streets of Belgrade. The war will certainly spread to Kosovo next as its Albanian majority tries to break away from Serbia. As the 400,000 minority Albanians in Macedonia rise up to help them, the war will spread there as Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece all try to carve Macedonia up between themselves under the guise of helping various minority factions. Turkey will be drawn in too because of its support for Yugoslav Muslims [16]. As for the West no one knows what it will do next, with close to a million of the 2.3 million war refugees already overflowing into Europe [17]. With immigration an explosive political issue already before the war in France and Germany, Europe may perhaps now start to act. If only I were here to force everyone together again!" Conclusion Nothing so far in this story can make comprehensible the cowardice and cruelty of the war against civilians. We may understand now that it is not mere feral, senseless cruelty, but that there must be a method and a purpose behind it, that it is a strategy to capture territory with a minimum of armed engagement. Isolated individuals who commit such acts can be dismissed as criminally insane; but the Serb irregulars are good neighbors turned into demons, innocuous citizens inexplicably transformed into agents of evil, led not by gangsters but by a banker, a psychiatrist, and a noted Shakespeare scholar! [18] We have no glimpses of the lives of Serb guerrillas to give us the beginning of an understanding of how they justify their actions. As long as this remains the case, it is impossible to see how the West can find a lasting political solution to the conflict, for if we do not know what makes these men kill, we can only guess poorly at what may make them stop. We appear to have advanced no further in dealing with nationalism than Chamberlain when he smilingly declared "peace in our time." In a world more aware of the dangers of nationalism, the horrific scale of the present war could have been avoided if the West had supported the moderate over the nationalist parties in the surrounding republics, as well as putting pressure on Milosevic to restrain the brutal policies that fueled nationalist fervor in the rest of Yugoslavia. The past year, and a goodly number of years before that, have demonstrated our inability to recognize, defuse, or control nationalism, or even unite nations against it for a "New World Order." After half a century we had subconsciously hoped that fanatical nationalism was a kind of madness that we had outgrown, and that were it to flare up anywhere again, the mocking attitude of the rest of the world would make those rogue countries quickly realize the preposterousness of their ideas. It has not happened. The madness has returned. Even if it is not in the heart of Europe, the eruption of Yugoslavia should not be looked upon as a hot war to be quenched, but as an alarm to treat nationalism seriously rather than dismissively. History has not ended; it appears to have been reborn, and as frighteningly recent history at that. Richard Bondi, Charlottesville, August 10, 1992 Endnotes: [1] N. Beloff, Tito's Flawed Legacy: Yugoslavia and the West, 1939-84 (London: Victor Golancz, Ltd, 1985) 74. [2] The most famous account of this prolonged civil war and its killing fields is the bitter novel "The Knife" by Vuk Draskovic. [3] V. P. J. Gagnon, "Yugoslavia," Foreign Affairs 3 (1991): 20. [4]F. M. Bordewich, "Yugoslavia Since Tito," New York Times April 13 1986, Section 6, Page 54, Column 1 [5] D. Rusinow, "Yugoslavia: Balkan Breakup?," Foreign Policy Summer (1991): 149; Aida. [6] M. Glenny, "Who Killed Yugoslavia?," New York Review of Books January 30 (1992): 31 [7] C. J. Williams, "Democratic Pluralism Eludes Croatians," Los Angeles Times February 29 1992, A12 [8] S. Drakulic, "Journalisten Sind Immer Noch Staatsfeinde," Die Zeit July 17 1992, 21 [9] P. Maass, "Hear the One About Franjo Tudjman?," The Washington Post 6/5/1992 1992, A44 [10] M. T. Kaufman, "A War On Civilians," The New York Times July 18 1992, A1 [11] M. Glenny, "Who Killed Yugoslavia?," New York Review of Books June 30 (1992): 31-2 [12] B. Harden, "Observers Accuse Yugoslav Army," The Washington Post 1/17/92 1992, A23 [13] C. J. Williams, "News Analysis: Undermining Peace in the Balkans," Los Angeles Times 1/11/92 1992, A11 [14] M. Glenny, "The Yugoslav Tragedy," New York Review of Books August 13 (1992): 38 [15] M. O'Kane, "Escape from Sarajevo," The Manchester Guardian Weekly May 31 1992 [16] M. Glenny, "Who Killed Yugoslavia?," New York Review of Books June 30 (1992): 34 [17] M. Battiata, "Wester Europe Offers Funds But Not Havens for Refugees," The Washington Post July 30 1992, A22 [18] John F. Burns and Jon Jones, "The Dying City of Sarajevo," The New York Times July 26 1992, Section 6, 12-17 BIBLIOGRAPHY Battiata, M., "Wester Europe Offers Funds But Not Havens for Refugees," The Washington Post July 30 1992, A22 Beloff, N., Tito's Flawed Legacy: Yugoslavia and the West, 1939-84 (London: Victor Golancz, Ltd, 1985) Bordewich, F. M., "Yugoslavia Since Tito," New York Times April 13 1986, Section 6, Page 54, Column 1 Burns, J. F. and J. Jones, "The Dying City of Sarajevo," The New York Times July 26 1992, Section 6, 12-17 Drakulic, S., "Journalisten Sind Immer Noch Staatsfeinde," Die Zeit July 17 1992, 21 Gagnon, V. P. J., "Yugoslavia," Foreign Affairs 3 (1991): Glenny, M., The Rebirth of History (London: Penguin Books, 1990) Glenny, M., "Who Killed Yugoslavia?," New York Review of Books January 30 (1992): Glenny, M., "The Yugoslav Tragedy," New York Review of Books August 13 (1992): Harden, B., "Observers Accuse Yugoslav Army," The Washington Post January 17 1992, A23 Kaufman, M. T., "A War On Civilians," The New York Times July 18 1992, A1 Maass, P., "Hear the One About Franjo Tudjman?," The Washington Post June 5 1992, A44 O'Kane, M., "Escape from Sarajevo," The Manchester Guardian Weekly May 31 1992, Pavlowitch, S. K., Yugoslavia (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971) 149; Aida. [6] M. Glenny, "Who Killed Yugoslavia?," New York Review of Books January 30 (1992): 31 [7] C. J. Williams, "Democratic Pluralism Eludes Croatians," Los Angeles Times February 29 1992, A12 [8] S. Drakulic, "Journalisten Sind Immer Noch Staatsfeinde," Die Zeit July 17 1992, 21 [9] P. Maass, "Hear the One About Franjo Tudjman?," The Washington Post 6/5/1992 1992, A44 [10] M. T. Kaufman, "A War On Civilians," The New York Times July 18 1992, A1 [11] M. Glenny, "Who Killed Yugoslavia?," New York Review of Books June 30 (1992): 31-2 [12] B. Harden, "Observers Accuse Yugoslav Army," The Washington Post 1/17/92 1992, A23 [13] C. J. Williams, "News Analysis: Undermining Peace in the Balkans," Los Angeles Times 1/11/92 1992, A11 [14] M. Glenny, "The Yugoslav Tragedy," New York Review of Books August 13 (1992): 38 [15] M. O'Kane, "Escape from Sarajevo," The Manchester Guardian Weekly May 31 1992 [16] M. Glenny, "Who Killed Yugoslavia?," New York Review of Books June 30 (1992): 34 [17] M. Battiata, "Wester Europe Offers Funds But Not Havens for Refugees," The Washington Post July 30 1992, A22 [18] John F. Burns and Jon Jones, "The Dying City of Sarajevo," The New York Times July 26 1992, Section 6, 12-17 BIBLIOGRAPHY Battiata, M., "Wester Europe Offers Funds But Not Havens for Refugees," The Washington Post July 30 1992, A22 Beloff, N., Tito's Flawed Legacy: Yugoslavia and the West, 1939-84 (London: Victor Golancz, Ltd, 1985) Bordewich, F. M., "Yugoslavia Since Tito," New York Times April 13 1986, Section 6, Page 54, Column 1 Burns, J. F. and J. Jones, "The Dying City of Sarajevo," The New York Times July 26 1992, Section 6, 12-17 Drakulic, S., "Journalisten Sind Immer Noch Staatsfeinde," Die Zeit July 17 1992, 21 Gagnon, V. P. 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