| [ economics ] in KIDS 글 쓴 이(By): artistry (요키에로타) 날 짜 (Date): 1998년 10월 26일 월요일 오전 04시 53분 15초 제 목(Title): 이코노/기든스 내한강연 전문 제 458호 1998.10.27 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - 기든스 英 런던 대학장 내한 강연 全文 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - [편집자주] 이 글은 인터넷 독자에게만 드리는 특별 서비스 입니다. 독일의 사회철학자인 위르겐 하버마스와 함께 유럽 최고의 지성으로 꼽히는, '영국의 자존심' 기든스(Anthony Giddens·60) 영국 런던대 정경대학장이 10월 11일 방한했다가 다음날인 12일 서울대를 찾아 강연을 했다. 강연 주체는 '근대성과 세계화(Modernity and Globalization)'. 영국의 토니 블레어 총리가 주창한 '제3의 길'의 이론적 지주 답게 그는 이날 강연에서 세계화가 제3의 길의 주요한 모티브였다고 단정했다. 그러면서 그는 전통적 좌·우파의 시각으로는 시·공간이 재구성되는 요즘 적응력을 지닐 수 없다고 말했다. 다시말해 새로운 경제질서를 창조로 보는 신자유주의적인 낙관론이나 산업화의 연장선상에서 여전히 복지국가의 중요성만 강조하는 사회민주주의자들의 비관론 모두 현실성이 없다는 점을 자세하게 설명했다. 이 강연에서 그가 결론적으로 강조한 것은 첫째, 전세계로 확대된 시장의 역동성을 기반으로 하면서도 성과 지역, 환경 등 새롭게 등장한 문제에 대해서는 국가의 적극적 개입을 인정해야 한다는 것과 둘째, 활동적인 시민사회를 통해 민주주의를 제고해야 한다는 것이었다. 서울대에서의 강연 전문을 원문으로 소개한다. Personal Profile Anthony Gibbens is a distinguished scholar in the fields of sociology and political economy. Dr. Gibbens earned a B.S. in sociology (1959) at the University of Hur in England, M.A. in sociology at the London School of Economics (1961), and his Ph.D. at the University of Cambridge (1976). Since then he has lectured in various institutions including the Universities of Lester and Cambridge. From 1986 until the present he has professor of sociology at the University of Cambridge, also serving as the Dean of the London School of Economics and Finance. He has published many books and articles including one recent publication (1998) "The Third Way: Renewal of Social Democracy." Seminar Modernity and Globalization This is supposed to be a seminar so I was going to talk for maybe one-half an hour and then invite discussion from the audience. Let me first say how happy I am to be in Korea even if only for a fairly short visit of only two days, but it's a great pleasure to be here. I'm happy to be here not only for myself but also on behalf of the London School of Economics. We're keen on establishing further connections between the LSE and Korean universities. The topic of my talk, as mentioned, is "Modernity and Globalization" but what I plan to do is to spend more time on globalization, than on modernity. The reason is that I think it is of strong interest to everyone here in Korea at the moment. The term "globalization" is itself 'globalized'. It just amazing when you go around the world how everyone everywhere is discussing globalization. Certainly in the English speaking world in English this is a new term. The term "globalization" only dates from about ten years back. Ten years ago hardly anyone was using the term globalization. Globalization has come from nowhere to be everywhere. When a term like this comes from nowhere to be everywhere, you can be assured that it represents some real changes going on in the world. Whatever one makes of the discussion around the idea of globalization, it's signals something really happening in the world, the fact that the word has become so popular--it's perhaps most popular term sociological term of the moment, I think. Certainly in Europe it's almost impossible to open a newspaper without some talk of globalization. And, as I understand it, in the wake of the crisis of the Korean economy, and the intervention of the IMF, there is even a more pronounced discussion of globalization and what it means in this country, too. I. Hyper-globalizers So a large part of what I have to say this morning will concern what globalization does mean when you look at it as a sociologist. What one is looking at here is a series of big transformations in world society. It is not an empty term, globalization, it refers to changes that are transforming the world in which we live. Now, since the word globalization was nowhere and now it is everywhere it is not surprising that it is the subject of big controversy. There is an intense academic debate surrounding the notion of globalization, certainly in Europe and the United States. This debate separates people into two quite opposed schools of thought. First, there are those who have come to be called (in the Anglo-Saxon debate) the "hyper-globalizers." The hyper-globalizers are people who take a particular view of what globalization is, and what it is doing to the world. What is this view? A good example of the hyper-globalizer would be the writer from somewhere reasonable close to this part of the world Konichi Omi, the Japanese business writer. He would be an example of a hyper-globalizer. According to this view, globalization has already radically transformed the world in which we live. Globalization refers to the economic marketplace and especially to the impact of financial capital in an intensified global marketplace. According to Omi and others like him, this is already largely a completed process. We are not in the early stage of globalization. It is already here, already affected us, it has already made big changes in how we live. In the view of the hyper-globalizers, the nation-state in obsolete. In the view of the hyper-globalizers national identity is what Omi calls a fiction. National identity is a kind of "hang-over" from the past. Omi, if you know his books, speaks of the borderless economy, he also the wrote a book called "The End of the Nation-State." He is not the only one, there are many others. According to the hyper-globalizers, the reason why nobody is particularly interested politicians anymore and why politicians have trouble making their views count is simply that politics has become irrelevant. The world is dominated by economic forces. Politicians have lost power as the nation-state has lost its influence. When the hyper-globalizers speak of the end of the nation-state, they are serious about it. They think that it is something already happening and due to be concluded in probably the short term: some 20-30 years. Some of the hyper-globalizers say that what is happening to the world is radical fragmentation, under the impact of a globalized market society. They say that within 20-30 years instead of a world of nation-states, we will see and world of city-states of local power. Some people say that there may be a thousand city-states like Hong Kong or Singapore in the world within the next 20-30 years. Omi and others point to the emergence of new economic regions that have nothing to do with the nations of which they are a part. If you think of southwest China, for example you have an autonomous economic area; it's part of China, but not part of China. If you think of Barcelona in Europe; Barcelona is supposedly a city in Spain, but it's not really a part of Spain it's more a part of France, it's linked to European Union. Hyper-globalizers would say it's become a global city. The idea of a global city is a key idea of this approach. So, in summary, this view sees globalization as being very far advanced. It sees it as almost purely economic. It sees it as having already destroyed much of the power of the nation-state and it sees politics (government) as largely irrelevant to the future. The future is going to be a type of globalized marketplace. It's important to notice that nearly all of the hyper- globalizers see this as a good thing. They see the impact of economic globalization as beneficial because they argue that unconstrained free trade brings public benefits. Trade is the basic medium of creating wealth, they say. So in an unconstrained global marketplace this is simply the best way business can flourish and the world can become richer. For awhile in the United States the hyper-globalizing view was linked to the so-called "New Paradigm." This suggested that continuous economic prosperity and stability were possible in a low inflation world economy. The new paradigm argued that we have already reached a world of unending prosperous, low inflation growth. And that economic globalization is the medium for securing such growth. I have to say that the new economic paradigm is already in ruins as a result of what has happened in the world over the past four or five months. Nevertheless for awhile it was a popular kind of theory. So that's the hyper-globalizers. That's one perspective, but not just a perspective, a concept on globalization and its consequences. II. Globalization Skeptics The second perspective is completely different, almost the opposite of the hyper globalizers. This has come to be called the perspective of the globalization skeptics. People who are skeptical, not just about the value of globalization, but the very existence of globalization at all. Key figures among the globalization skeptics are the two authors Hirst and Thompson who wrote a book called "Globalization in Question." This is certainly one book I would recommend if anyone is interested in this debate even though I don't agree with the position they propose. "Globalization in Question" has become the Bible of the globalization skeptics. Another prominent globalization skeptic is the economist Paul Krugman from MIT, who all the way along has argued that the notion of globalization is largely a myth. What do the globalization skeptics say? Well, as I have mentioned, they have almost a completely contradictory view of what is happening in the world from the hyper-globalizers. According to the globalization skeptics there is no such thing as globalization. Or, put another way, our era is not distinctively different from previous periods of world history. So the globalization skeptics say if you look back to the late 19th century or the early period of the 20th century before the period of the First World War, there was already a dynamic, open world economy. There was a great deal of trade between different parts of the world. There were large amounts of migration from different parts of the world to other parts of the world. There was a trade in currency, gold and other currency at this period. So the globalization skeptics say, "Well, what's new?" Our period is not any different from the period of the turn of the last century. Therefore they argue that the whole notion of globalization is really a myth. For them the term globalization is an ideological term invented by neo-liberal economic and political thinkers who want to attack the welfare state, who want to change the political system and use the idea of globalization as a convenient way of doing so. Just as the hyper-globalizers tend to be on the political right or the liberal right, the globalization skeptics tend to be on the political left, the social democratic left. Because this view that there is nothing new in the world allows them to say "Oh well, we can just keep the existing welfare state in tact. We can keep the structure of government in tact. We don't have to worry about many of the things that people are worrying about these days because the whole thing is an ideological invention anyway. So, all we have to do is clear away the ideological dust and then we will see that the nation-state is still in tact. The state still can control economic policy. We don't have to give up Keysanian economics. We can still defend the welfare state. We don't have to think too much about the changing position of women or the family because this can simply be dealt with within the national economy." It's not surprising therefore that the globalization skeptics don't really like the idea of globalization. They are not just skeptical about the idea, they think the aspects of globalization that do exist they regard rather negatively. I'd suggest to you that this is a common reaction both on the political left and right. There was a book written in France, for example, called "The Economic Horror." This was a highly critical book about the impact of globalization suggesting that the need to limit trade and we should revert to a type of protectionist position. III. Globalization and Politics Something interesting, just to set a framework for this is that the idea of globalization does now tend to polarize political opinion. Even the very concept of globalization tends to polarize political opinion. You have a left, which is both skeptical of the idea of globalization and hostile, but on the other side of the liberal center, all around the world you have a new far right. The new far right now defines itself by reference to the globalization debate. By the new far right I mean politicians like Pat Robertson in the United States; the fundamentalist right in the United States. Le Pen in France, Pauline Hansen in Australia, and Ross Perot when he was popular in the United States. They all share a certain orientation in common. They even share it with a made fringe of the radical right like the Patriots in the United States, who are armed, right wing revolutionaries. They are all defined now, I think, by reference to the idea of globalization. What defines the new far right is economic protectionism, cultural protectionism (where that cultural protectionism takes the form of a xenophobic relationship to other cultures). The far right says that we must get out of the global economy because it is threatening; we must defend our local identity and our local culture and we must make sure this culture is not contaminated, by noxious cultural forces from the outside. I don't mean to say that these views are only held on the radical right, but they have become a kind of defining nature of the radical right and there is quite a lot of violence associated with these ideas. In Europe certainly, in Germany for example, they tend to breed racist conflicts. Attacks on immigrants in Germany have been very much fueled by this kind of reaction to globalization. So, I think that everyone can see that an enormous amount hangs on what globalization is, whether it is indeed a reality. And an enormous amount hangs on what our reaction to it should be politically. As sociologists, as social scientists, we have to both conceptualize globalization, we have to take a position in relation to this debate. We also have to try and work out, if you think of a country like Korea or a country like the United Kingdom, what our political reaction will be and whatever decision we make about the reality of globalization and the concept of globalization. So, in the wake of this debate, how should we think about the phenomenon? What side of these two is more nearly correct, what are we to make of the whole debate about globalization? IV. The Globalization Debate First, although the position of the globalization skeptics is superficially attractive, are definitively wrong. Today the world economy is definitively different from the world economy of one hundred years ago. Since this debate first developed there has been a lot of empirical work carried out by the political scientist David Held including a big book on globalization coming out pretty soon. He shows definitively that the level of integration of the world economy is much, much higher that it has ever been before. Even as measured in terms of the trading of goods. He also shows that it includes the trading of a much greater variety of services than were ever traded before. If you consider the tourism industry-it's a kind of trade of services-it's massively greater than it has ever been in any previous period of history. If you look at finance capital, the difference is very remarkable. One of the most important features of economic globalization is the creation of electronic money and the emergence of 24-hour money markets. These were effectively invented in Chicago, some 25-30 years ago. This is something new on the world historical scene and everyone is very conscious, especially in Asia, of course in very conscious at the this moment of what the power of electronic financial markets can be when you can shift capital instantaneously by clicking on the mouse of your computer from one part of the world to the other. The current period of economic globalization is not therefore just a continuation of the past, but something different. I think this is really crucial to that extent I think that the hyper globalizers are right, there is something new in the world. However, the hyper-globalizers themselves are wrong in various ways. This is not the end point of the globalization, I believe we are in the early phases. I believe that we are in the early stages of the globalization processes which are due to transform all our lives. This is not a finished state, it is the beginning of a series of global shocks or transformations, which for better or worse we will all have to life through. I think we are the first generation living through something like the creation of a global, cosmopolitan society, which is dislocating our personal institutions right away through from our personal lives to large systems which move the world. In my view there are major positive aspects to this as well as negative ones. The hyper-globalizers are wrong in several ways. Both sides are wrong to regard globalization as solely economic or even primarily economic. Of course a good deal of the driving force of globalization comes from the driving force of the global marketplace. But globalization is not primarily an economic phenomenon, it is a restructuring of basic social, cultural and political institutions as well. If you look at the difference between globalization now, and internationalization in previous periods, it's the marriage between satellite communication and computerization, which only dates from some 30 or so years ago. Communication is what globalization is now and instantaneous communication across the face of the earth is in some respects the driving force of the new globalization. One should not be too technological about this of course, but 24-hour money markets would not have been possible without the transformation of global communications. If you consider the fall of the Soviet Union and even the transformation in South Africa, the changes that went on in Eastern Europe, they were the first tele-visual revolutions. The influence of television and media communications was central to what happened in 1989 in Eastern Europe. There was a wave effect of transformation and probably this extended to other areas of the world; the peace settlement in Northern Ireland at the moment, for example, has been picked up immediately in the Basque countries in Spain and several other parts of the world. This is a world of dialogic global communication. When you have instantaneous communication across the world it just doesn't shift structures on a large scale, it shifts the way we feel about ourselves. When the image of Nelson Mandela is more familiar than the image of your next door neighbor, there is a structural shift in people's lives associated with living in this world. So, it's not just the economic marketplace, communication is central to the new period of globalization. As communication develops, throughout the world particularly electronic communication, computerized electronic communication, globalization become de-centered. Even though you might feel in this country, as my country did at one time, being the recipient of an IMF grant, that globalization is being run by the major powers. This is not so anymore. The G-7 nations of course have a strong influence over what happens. Nevertheless globalization is much more de-centered than it ever was. Previously globalization meant internationalization, the expansion of the West across the world. Western countries are just as subject to globalization processes as other countries. De-centered globalization is effectively not controlled by anyone at the moment for better or for worse. When you think of globalization, you should think, not of a single set of processes, one should not think of a single set of movements, one should think of opposed movements happening in different parts of the world. If you want a visual image of how globalizing processes work, you should think of it as a kind of three-fold set of movements. Globalization to some extent pulls power away from the nation-state, into the global arena. On the other hand, globalization also pushes down, it creates more demand for more local autonomy, it stands behind the rise of local nationalisms. Contrary to what many people think, I think these forces make possible local renewal. They can help reconstruct civil society, community. Globalization is not just destructive of these things, its push down effect provides the possibility of community renewal; the renewal of urban fabric and the wider renewal of civil society. Globalizations pulls away, pushes downward, but it also squeezes sideways. Globalization produces new regions in much the sense that Omi says. Go back to one of my examples in Europe, Barcelona. It is still part of Spain and if you're in Catalonia, where Barcelona is, Catalonia still in part of Spain. But if you're a Catalan, you may be in Barcelona and regard yourself as being part of Europe. You would see yourself as Catalan, Spanish, European, and a citizen of Barcelona-all at the same time. In this kind of world, this is what you would describe as a kind of "fuzzy sovereignty." This is the consequence of globalization. It's a very interesting consequence. If you always stress that globalization is a multiple phenomenon with many forces working in different directions, you should remember the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of the bi-polar world is an aspect of globalizing processes. With the disappearance of the bi-polar world is a crucial aspect of globalization. With the disappearance of the bi-polar world sovereignty does not mean the same thing, nations do not have the same role in the world. Basically, although in Korea you have the particular problem of the North and the South of immanent unification, nations no longer have enemies, geopolitics does not count for the same weight as it did before 1989. Most nations like the U.K. face risks and dangers rather than enemies. A world where societies face risks and dangers is clearly a world where we all have to act together. As sovereignty becomes more fuzzy, so people can have multiple identities and so, in principle, nations can collaborate to face the risks and dangers. Whether they are ecological risks or risks of the melt down of the global financial system or whatever. We have to think, therefore of globalization as a dialectical process, producing difference consequences through the same forces in different parts of the world. I think that it is pretty plain to see that the hyper-globalizers are wrong in saying that the power of the nation-state simply declines. It depends of which nation-side in which part of the world at which time which forces influencing it. Consider Eastern Europe, for example, these nations have more autonomy, not less. This is because of the breakdown of the Soviet Empire, which basically kept them prisoners previously. There are many new states in the world. By becoming new states, they have more autonomy, rather than less. This is a period, where for the first time, the nation-state has become universalized. This form in itself has become globalized. While the Soviet Union still existed, there was still an imperial system, but there is no imperial system of a direct kind, any way, longer in the world. So you could make the opposite argument and say that this is the first time that the nation-state has been a universal political form. So, yes you get many changes affecting nation-states, but these are not simply one-way changes. Globalization affects different nations differently, there are different forces playing at different parts of the world and depending on a nation's history a great deal will be consequential for where that nation goes. However I would like to suggest to you that in respect to sovereignty and the nation, the emergence of the European Union is particularity interesting. I think that everyone in Asia should reflect on it a bit. What is important to me about the European Union is not that it is European, but that it is trying to pioneer a form of transnational governance, which recognizes the emergence of fuzzy sovereignty and recognizes that we are no longer in the geo-political era of nation-states. The European Union is an amazing phenomenon because only 30 or so years ago it looked as if the European nations could not contain their rivalries. Of course Europe itself was the site of two World Wars. But over this 30 years the European countries have given up, quite voluntarily, a great deal of there own sovereignty over their own affairs and ceded this to European courts of law, to the European commission and the European parliament. In an era of globalization, where it is very, very real, we must experiment with transnational forms of governance. The European Union, therefore, could be seen and should be seen as a particular regional area, but as a kind of bridgehead to a kind of more sustained global governance. In Asia, too, I feel that an architecture of transnational government will have to be built. This needs to be transnational democratic government. I feel that we are in an era when global governance is both needed and no longer Utopian. If you take globalization seriously, then you must respond to it seriously on a global level. Whether the nations can actually do this, we don't know, but it is no longer beyond the bounds of possibility. The Breton Woods' institutions will become progressively transformed over the next few years. Again I recommend the writings of David Held on "Cosmopolitan Democracy." David Held argues that a sort of global democracy is again a real possibility. If you stand back from this and ask then "What is globalization after all?" In a sociological sense, globalization is the transformation of time and space in our lives. Globalization is not just economic, not just political, not just cultural. It is a shift in our relationships to one another; in the meaning of space and time in our lives. That's why communications are so central to it. Whether you accept this or not, I don't know. If you do, it means that globalization is not just an "out there" phenomenon. Globalization is an "in here" phenomenon. Globalization is not just an area of the social sciences, it is not just the impact of the world on us. It is how we live. Globalization is now how we live. That means it is as much a part of our emotional lives, our personal lives; the transformation of marriage, family, gender relations as it is of the large-scale systems. The reason is in a world of communication, in a more reflexive world tradition and custom loose the held they once had over our lives. Of course they still exist in many areas, but tradition and custom have less impact over our lives than they used to do. As they have less hold over our lives, so we have to invent our lives, create our lives more actively on the level of personal identity, the emotions, how we form relationships with other people, how we consider marriage, how we consider sexuality and so forth. The transformations in the family are just as crucial an aspect of globalization as are the more familiar governmental and economic aspects of it. If you consider the relationship between men and women, for example, this is truly a global, infrastructural revolution. There has never been a society before in which women are becoming more equal to men, but women are becoming more equal to men gradually or faster, according to context, all over the world. You cannot have traditional family structures when you have equality of the sexes. You must reconstruct family policy politically and you must look for a new, cosmopolitan family form. This will happen in Korea, just as much as it will happen elsewhere. And, as you do this, of course, your very identity as a man or woman tends to be much more open to negotiation. You have to decide what to be rather than just be given a social role. Social roles no longer define gender relations in the way they used to do in the past. So you must see obalization, I feel, as with as much to do with the local, the personal and it is to do with the large scale, as it is to do with the big systems that are transforming the world on the kind of macro-level. These things having been said, I would like to argue in summary that globalization is indeed real, it is indeed different from the past. It is de-centered, the core of it is communication. It is driven by economic factors but cannot be purely economic, it is creating a new kind of society; a cosmopolitan, global society, which is as much local in its consequences as it is truly global. This is the society of the future to which we have to learn to adapt. What should be our political reactions to this? Should we have a positive or negative attitude towards globalization? Should we embrace it or should we resist it? V. The Attitude Toward Globalization I have a strong position on this. I am hostile to economic protectionism. If you consider the economic aspects of globalization it is a great mistake to suppose that protectionism is a long-term sustainable position. Economic protectionism would be disastrous for the world as a whole, if we became a series of closed-off economic blocks, probably in conflict with one another. It would not generate economic growth and prosperity. It is the case that globalization is the key to economic prosperity today. One must take a positive attitude towards globalization, but this does not mean embracing the remedies of the IMF. It does not mean simply identifying globalization with the liberalization of the economy, with deregulation of enterprise with a kind of economic formulae, which have dominated economic and political thinking over the past 20-30 years. No, instead, what we need is a new global politics for the economic age. A new politics for the global age cannot be just economic, it must realize that a market society needs a sustaining framework of institutions. It must recognize that this is true at the global level as well as at the local level. It must recognize that we are talking about the transformation of governance here and the transformation of economic life itself. What we are looking for all across the world is a new partnership between government and business, in which both are active and dynamic, but which still recognizes the needs for social security and protection for all of us exposed to the world economy. Therefore, free trade is a good thing, but only if you recognize that you have to work out the consequences of what opening up a market means. These consequences can be destructive. Naive embrace of free trade is not a sensible policy. Free trade, therefore, needs to be integrated within a wider frame of institutions. Within a society like Korea (or the U.K.) this means several forms of modernization. These forms of modernization are now what we call "Third Way" politics; an attempt to get beyond the two lapsing political philosophies of the post-War period: old style social democracy, with its emphasis on the nation, national economy, Keysanism, the welfare-state, and neo-liberalism (with its emphasis on you can simply treat the world as a gigantic market place and all you need is economic development for the world to be happy and prosperous). Third Way philosophy tries to break from each of these. It argues that we must confront the world on local, national and transnational levels. We must re-invent government as we re-invent the economy. We must re-invent civil society, modernizing processes need to go through each of the key institutions of the wider system. I believe that Third Way politics will dominate the next 20 or so years, in the way that neo-liberalism has dominated the last 20 years. I believe that the global dialogue, which is itself now emerging as a part of globalization, a global dialogue where political leaders like Tony Blair, we hope Gerhard Scherder and other social democratic leaders in Europe, President Carlos in Brazil and leaders in Asia we hope will participate in this dialogue. We need to find, on a global scale and the local level a society with is dynamic economically, but which is inclusive socially. We need to recognize that there is no such thing as a free market. A free market depends on a framework of institutions. If you see what happens in Russia, you can see how disastrous is the idea that you can produce a functioning free market purely economically. You can't do that. Moreover, a functioning free market depends on a functioning democratic system. A functioning democratic system does not just come about through the free market. What we have in Russia is a type of gangster capitalism, which shows you that capitalism in and of itself does not produce democracy. Democracy has to be sustained through an active civil society and the creation of multi-party democratic institutions. Many people in Korea, in the one day that I have been here, have said that many of these reforms need doing in Korea. But Korea is really no different from the rest of the world, because they need doing elsewhere too. In the United Kingdom, although there is a tradition of liberal democracy, it is not democratic enough. People no longer trust politicians, politics is not close enough to the people, constitutional reform is needed. A great deal of reform in needed in British society. We need a Freedom of Information Act, we need a transform of the House of Lords. The modernization of democracy is just as important in my country as it is, I think, in yours. What's happening now is very important I think. It's what happened one hundred years ago, the emergence of a new sociological understanding of what it means to live in a global, cosmopolitan society. It's also the emergence of a political program linked to that, a political program which I would like to think reflects left values; center left values anyway, but sees that these need quite a different framework in the global era. This, therefore, breaks from the old-style social democracy. Modernizing social democracy is a key part of how one would approach a political program for the global era. Thank you very much for inviting me and I'm sorry that I went on longer than I intended. Questions & Answer (Q)You've said that the dialogical democracy should be extended to the globalizational dimension. But I think there can happen a separation between ones who participate and the others who can't participate in the communication, so I'm afraid this will be a factor which hinder the realization of dialogical democracy. (A)You put your finger on a key issue. I don't think that it is simply a matter of individual capability though, it's a matter of social capabilities. They can be built and influenced by what governments do. In this new book, what I argue for is the cosmopolitan nation. I think it's a mistake of many people to suppose that the nation-state can disappear or national identity should disappear. It would be bad for the world if it did. You need national identity as a solidifying feature of the world. I would still want us to be Korean, to be British, to be French. But that identity has to be part of what I called earlier, a cosmopolitan conversation with others. If you ask how to achieve that, I think I would offer the European Union as I was saying in my talk as a model. It is not just a matter of individuals not being capable of it, its whether or not you've got the institutions as well. In Korea, with some similarities to Britain, because there is a certain isolationism, certain hostility to the outside world, a sort of tinge of xenophobic reaction to other cultures. All of that is present in British culture as well because it's has got its own history. It's part of Europe, but finds it difficult to be part of the European Union. Assuming that it is restructured in some way, the European Union gives you some idea of how you can still have a cosmopolitan community. I think national identity is still crucial because you need a community to belong to. It is the only way to develop new welfare systems-if you're going to develop new systems, you need a kind of commitment to the idea of Korean society and so on. If it is too xenophobic then of course it will rebound. And you know, there's obviously a strong process of education there, and not a short term project. I do feel structural conditions in the world... Therefore it is possible to see the emergence of the kind of dialogic democracy, as I said before in the earlier book, because of the disappearance of the bi-polar world and because of the fact that sovereignty and territory don't count for the same as they used to do. If you consider Northern Ireland, which is an extraordinary thing in my country, the apparent solution to the problem of Northern Ireland, that's possible because of these structural changes. Previously, it used to be either part of the U.K. or part of Ireland and that was it. You're on one side or the other. But now the new constitution says, well you're a part of Ulster, you're part of a wider Ireland, you're part of the U.K., you're part of the European Union. It is fuzzy sovereignty that has had this peace process possible. So I do think there are a lot of positives to this and you can see how such a democracy could be constructed. There are some models around. There are some changes promoting it. (Q)What is the key factor of the organization of the political and economic unity in Europe, for example, European Union. And what do you think of the relation between this unity and the Third Way? (A)Yeah, well, when you look at the history of the European Union and the reasons why it was possible in Europe, a crucial thing was the working together of certain political leaders at a certain time. Germany, France especially who saw, these leaders saw the horrific background of Europe to avoid a future war in Europe. At the same time, they saw a convergence of interest and they were able to push the community along. I would say that Kohl was the last of the leaders of that generation. You must have leaders who agree upon a project. They can see a long way ahead of their populations. I think the European Union needs to get more in touch with its population. Just like the same thing happened in a way in Russia because what is a very interesting book on this by Mike McGuire. What Gorbachev did was to see that the structural world had shifted and he suggested a new internationalism at that time and I think he really meant it. Therefore he did not send troops into Eastern Germany, when he could have done. I think possibly Eastern Europe might have stayed intact for a longer while if they had sent troops in at a certain juncture. They decided not to and Gorbachev was strongly influenced by the view that the world was interdependent. There could no longer be just an arms race and political leaders could make a difference against the background of the interpretation of the political structure of the world. Well, the same thing could happen in Asia with the right political leadership. I don't want to offer the European Union as directly a model for everyone else because I think that it has problems. I do think transnational governance is not going to be government, it's going to be governance, is inevitable now. Otherwise you can't have a world as a casino financial economy. We now see, particularly in Asia, what the consequence of this is. You can have these vast inflows and outflows of capital that have nothing to do (or very little to do) with the structures of the society in question. The whole area can be devastated by panic phenomenon. We do need to get away from this system. To where there is capital available but where's there tighter regulation especially where there's capital speculation. And I think you need democratization above the level of the nation-state. If it is true that globalization is changing the nation-state as it surely is, then democracy cannot stop at the level of nation-state. So, for these reasons I see the European Union as a kind of pioneering endeavor. There is a lot of controversy about its origins and driving force so that's only one version. There is a famous thesis by the historian Allan Milwood, who said that the nations joined together to protect themselves as nations. The European Union was driven by saving the nation-state, rather than overcoming the nation-state. I don't really think so, I think that it was a product of overcoming the changing nature of the world. It was a Cold War project and it has to change itself now. It was a Cold War project itself, it was a kind of "Third Way" between communism and American liberalism and now the bi-polar world is gone and European Union itself needs to become more democratic. Thank everyone for coming and for the discussion. I hope this cosmopolitan dialogue will go on in future years. Thank you very much for coming. ▲ 제458호 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - 공자께서 말씀하셨다 : "활쏘기는 군자의 덕성과 비슷한 바 가 있으니, 활을 쏘아 과녁을 벗어나더라도 오히려 그 이유 를 자기 몸에서 구한다." |