| [ Politics ] in KIDS 글 쓴 이(By): claudia (가 아님...맧) 날 짜 (Date): 1997년12월14일(일) 19시38분41초 ROK 제 목(Title): [파이낸셜 타임즈] 재협상론 때문 아니다. 역시 하이텔에서 퍼온 글입니다... 여기 정치보드에도 자주 등장했던 신문(? 잡지?)인 걸로 아는데요... - limelite ================================================================== #27000 장재웅 (TheUser ) [파이낸셜 타임즈] 재협상론 때문 아니다. 12/14 18:12 61 line 부실 시중은행 폐쇄를 고집스럽게 피하고자 하는 노력이 경제 구조조정 의지가 부족하다는 신호로 받아들여지고 있어 신용도가 추락하고 있다는 내용입니다. (서울은행과 제일은행을 구체적으로 언급합니다.) At risk in Korea THURSDAY DECEMBER 11 1997 Only a week after it was assembled, the International Monetary Fund's $57bn rescue plan for South Korea seems to be coming unstuck. Had it done what was intended, the IMF package should by now have stabilised the Korean currency and prompted a resumptionof capital inflows which would help the country pay its short-term debts. Instead the won is in free fall, reserves remain perilously close to exhaustion and the risk is growing that private-sector Korean borrowers will end up defaulting on their foreign debt. The post-mortems must already be starting. Doubtless the markets are overshooting in their pessimism, given Korea's narrowing balance of payments deficit. But the IMF programme does look questionable in seeking to tighten credit in aneconomy already at risk from slumping demand. Korea has also failed to deliver. Its stubborn efforts to avoid closing two ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ conspicuously failing commercial banks signal a lack of serious intent to ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ restructure its bloated economy. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ More urgent, as the crisis unfolds, is the question of what to do next. The IM F and the industrial countries that contributed to its package must decide whether to commit more money and reinforce their existing approach, or whether to allow a default and concentrate on clearing up the mess. The risks in the latter approach are large. A default by a Korean bank in the international money market could trigger a contagious loss of confidence, sucking into the crisis banks from a range of emerging nations and exacerbating concern over Japanese banks. The consequences for the financial system would be severe. Yet it is difficult to see what can now be done to restore market confidence i n Korea, especially given the approaching presidential elections. Accelerating the disbursement of the funds already committed in the IMF package might lance the immediate problem. Confidence will not be restored, however, while the government dithers about reform. Had it closed Korea First and SeoulBank and taken over their foreign ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ liabilities, the market might have believed genuine restructuring was on the ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ way. But having disappointed yet again, Seoul will have to work harder still ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ to prove it accepts the need for structural change. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ As long as it ducks that challenge, the more governments and central banks will have to consider how to shore up the system as a whole. The central banking fraternity must stand ready to deal with the possibility of serious problems in the interbank market spreading from Korea. |