| [ PhilosophyThought ] in KIDS 글 쓴 이(By): guest (ddol) 날 짜 (Date): 1995년12월17일(일) 20시28분24초 KST 제 목(Title): Can God be immediately known? "God can be immediately known and experienced. This isn't really an argument for God's existence, rather it's the claim that you can know God exists wholly apart from arguments, simply by immediately experiencing him." - William Lane Craig, Craig-Washington Debate Craig asserts that God can be known, apart from any argument, through personal experience. While his presentation is more of an altar call than evidence, his suppositions carry a certain weight. How many times has 'personal experience' been used as a trump card for a position contrary to another proposition? If I were to assert that X does not exist, and provide a rational argument to that end, someone whom could say "but I have experienced X" could cast, at the very least, aspersions on my arguments. I would have to be able to either account for those experiences or be able to discount them for my original assertion to remain correct. Arguments from experience tend to have that effect. Having said that, there are three objections to Craig's particular argument that could stand for closer examination. The three objections that I will consider are 1) this claim has a circular nature, 2) there is a will to believe that can shape reality and 3) that a "self-confirming witness" does not replace the need for evidence, it just shifts the need of evidence from proof of God to proof that the experience is evidence of God. The objection that this argument for the existence of God is circular is, in my opinion, quite evident. According to Craig, if I am truly searching for God, he will make himself known to me. What if I don't receive this conformation of the existence of God? In his book Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics Craig says "No one in the final analysis really fails to become a Christian because of lack of arguments; he fails to become a Christian because he loves darkness rather than light and wants nothing to do with God" (p. 36). In other words, if I am seeking God and do not receive this authentication, it is my fault for not believing hard enough and I must believe harder. To take this point to its logical end, in order for me to receive the "self-authenticating witness" of Christianity's truth I must first accept its truth. In other words I assume what I am trying to confirm, in order to confirm it. The second objection to this argument ties neatly with the last one. Human beings seem to have the ability to mold their perception of reality. For instance my grandmother was the victim of abuse at the hands of my grandfather for many years, but to this day she still denies that any such occurrences ever took place, and in her mind they never did. Another example of this phenomena is that I have, in the past, been able to believe in something so strongly as to shape what I claimed to be truth, when it was not truth. What people claim to know as the truth seems to be shaped, to an extent, by what they wish to believe. If, as in the previous objection, I am seeking God and do not receive my confirmation, I must seek him more fervently. Is it not possible, even probable, that when I do finally 'experience God' what I perceive to be God is really that which I wish for and not God himself. The third argument dovetails with the last objection. While it is difficult to say that I can know the essence of another's experience, if the source of the experience is claimed to be something external to the individual, then that aspect of the experience should be open to investigation. Craig claims that the experience believers receive is a "self-confirming witness", but how does one know that they are experiencing God? For illustration, if I were to claim that my roommate was, in reality, Buddha and furthermore that being with him "enlightened" me, evidence to support my claim of my roommate's 'Buddha nature', but not my 'enlightenment' experience, would be in order. In this case, my lack of evidence to support my claim would be seen as evidence for my insanity, or at the very least my slightly wacky beliefs. However, the theists find themselves in the same conundrum when they claim that what they are experiencing is God. In both cases the essence of the experience is beyond intersubjective observation, the attribution of God as the source however can be objected to. |