| [ MIT ] in KIDS 글 쓴 이(By): Renoir (르놔르~) 날 짜 (Date): 1997년12월15일(월) 04시29분36초 ROK 제 목(Title): [뉴욕타임즈]한국의 위기:빌려주는사람 탓 12월 14일자 뉴욕타임즈 내용 NEW YORK -- What do you do if you discover that somebody used fictional financial statements when he persuaded you to grant a big loan? If you're the International Monetary Fund contemplating Korea, you moan and bear it. The alternative -- walking away from the lying borrower -- is unacceptable. The roots of this crisis go back to the bailout of Mexico in 1994, in which imprudent investors were made whole. It was hoped that reforms instituted then -- like forcing countries to disclose more information, faster, on the levels of foreign currency reserves and debts -- would prevent a recurrence. But they didn't work. What we've learned this year is that, as Sarafian used to say in my high school math class, "Figures don't lie, but liars figure." First we had Thailand showing plenty of foreign exchange reserves. But when the crisis came, it turned out that nearly all those reserves had been committed to support the baht. Then came South Korea, where nobody thought to mention that the central bank was making lots of loans to bail out foreign operations of Korean banks, draining most of the reported reserves. Those disclosures explain last week's collapse of the Korean won and the plunge of Korean stocks, which left shares of many good companies ridiculously low. The $57 billion bailout now looks small. But the IMF dares not desert its deceptive debtor. What would happen if the IMF did abandon Korea? Many Korean banks would fail, including some that could survive if given time. A lot of foreign banks, which imprudently lent money to those banks, would suffer, as they should. But so would Korean depositors and solvent Korean companies. The collapse of an important country's banking system could produce a domino effect. The international payments system might be in trouble, with serious implications everywhere. Our government and the IMF find the risks too great, so they won't close off the cash spigot. Korea knows that, so it demands better terms and delays in making promised reforms. As they used to say during the savings and loan debacle: "Make a small loan and get a debtor. Make a big one and get a partner." In the Mexican bailout, those who owned Mexican stocks were losers, but those who had taken advantage of superhigh Mexican interest rates did not suffer from currency depreciation. The lesson seemed to be that loans to emerging markets were safe from default. That encouraged capital to flow into markets regardless of risks, and it did, in unprecedented amounts. It is news now that Korean banks are in danger of immediate failure and that the government has little in the way of foreign exchange to support them. But it is not news that Korea's companies were overleveraged and that its banks were saddled with a lot of dubious loans. Unfortunately, such concerns did not prevent Korean banks from raising capital cheaply and gambling it around the world on, among other things, Latin American bonds. Many of the gambles failed, making the situation worse. That risk was known to IMF and American officials, but they saw themselves as powerless to do anything. They'd love to punish imprudent investors, but see the risk of doing so as too great. The big question is this: How can the world maintain the fear of failure to deter dangerous loans while not letting the system collapse when such loans go bad? There is no easy answer. But it is a question that can no longer be ignored. -르놔르~ 국제 신용에 크나큰 문제가 되어가고 있군요. 현대 엑셀 때문에 거의 모든 한국 차들의 신용이 떨어진 것 처럼... 정말 한 5~6년 넘게 갈지도 모르겠습니다. =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= 살아가는 것이란 변화한다는 것이며, Hoon (Paul) Kim 완벽하게 되는 것은 끊임없이 변화함으로 hpkim@ALUM.MIT.EDU 이뤄지는 것이다. (집)617-354-5694, (삐삐)617-668-7030 -- 김 훈, 1972~현재 http://www.shinbiro.com/~Renoir |